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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner-Appellant Erick Virgil Hall ("Hall") appeals, with permission from the 
Idaho Supreme Court, from two of the district court's interlocutory orders, which include 
(1) Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict 
Counsel and (2) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; 
and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order. 
Statem~11J Qf The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 20, 2003, Hall was charged with the first-degree murder and rape of 
Cheryl Ann Hanlon ("Cheryl"). (R., pp.IO, 54.) Hall was initially represented by Amil 
Myshin and D.C. Carr. (Id.) However, because Hall was earlier convicted of the first-
degree murder, kidnapping, and rape of Lynn Beth Henneman ("Lynn") and following 
that conviction a post-conviction petition was filed contending Myshin and Carr were 
ineffective ("Hall I"), Robert Chastain and Deborah Kristal were appointed to represent 
Hall in the case involving Cheryl ("Hall II"). (R., pp.10 n.1, 11, 54-55.) Hall was 
convicted of Cheryl's first-degree murder and rape, and the district court sentenced him 
to death for first-degree murder and consecutive fixed life for rape. (R., pp.10, 54-55.) 
With the assistance of the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), Hall filed a 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief challenging his convictions and death sentence in Hall 
II (R., pp.9-51); an amended petition was filed that included multiple claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel involving all four of his trial attorneys (R., pp.117-300). 
The state filed answers (R., pp.53-83, 923-1057) and motions for orders waiving the 
attorney-client privilege requesting Hall's four trial attorneys provide the state a "copy of 
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the same documents [they] provide[] to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office" 
and that the state be permitted to "discuss this case" with the four attorneys because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the post-conviction petition (R, pp.84-
91). After a hearing (Tr., pp.73-103), the motions were granted (R., pp.1249-51). 
On June 29, 2010, the SAPD filed a sealed Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict 
of Interest asserting a "possible conflict of interest regarding the State Appellate Public 
Defender (SAPD) representing Mr. Hall these post-conviction proceedings." (R., 
p.2043) ("Ex Parte Notice," p.1). 1 The SAPD's notice reiterated that, after Hall was 
convicted in Hall I, the SAPD was appointed to represent him during Hall I post-
conviction proceedings while his case in Hall II proceeded to trial. (Id., pp.1-2.) The 
SAPD's representation in IIall I involved the retention of experts, resulting in "overlap 
between some of the experts and testing in Hall I and Hall II," and it was the SAPD' s 
"understanding" the district court "encouraged the SAPD to cooperate with Mr. Hall's 
trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing results and expert reports, in an effort to 
preclude duplication of efforts and unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources." (Id., 
p.2.) "The SAPD cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert 
information obtained in Hall I" post-conviction proceedings. (Id.) As a result, attorneys 
with the SAPD's office "may have had contact with trial counsel [in Hall II] and that 
contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD' s continued representation of :\-fr. 
Hall" in Hall II post-conviction proceedings. (Id., pp.2-3 .) Therefore, the SAPD 
determined "independent counsel should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict." 
1 Hall's motion, along with various other sealed documents, was later unsealed and 
submitted as an exhibit to the record. 
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(Id., p.3.) Dennis Benjamin was "contacted" and "agreed to evaluate the conflict and 
advise Mr. Hall whether or not the conflict should be waived." (Id.) 
Although the state was not notified regarding the SAPD's Ex Parle Notice, on 
July 30, 2010, "in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays," 
the state filed a Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict requesting the court 
"inquire of [the SAPD] to ensure that there is no conflict" even though an attorney from 
the SAPD's office represented no conflict existed. (R., pp.1288-90). 
At a hearing on August 6, 2010, the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice and the state's 
motion were discussed with the SAPD agreeing the Ex Parte Notice was "not very 
specific," was even "opaque," and "didn't include any facts." (Tr., pp.241-42.) After 
requiring that the state be provided a copy of the Ex Parte Notice (Tr., pp.247-48), the 
district court reviewed relevant law and concluded it had "an affirmative duty to conduct 
an inquiry, and notice "the adequacy of th[ e] Court's inquiry is a constitutional issue" 
(Tr., pp.252-53). The Court further explained the question of whether a conflict actually 
exists "is a matter for the Court to decide" (Tr., p.255), and while it may have been 
"prudent" for the SAPD to "engage" Benjamin, it is the court's "obligation to conduct an 
inquiry ... and make those determinations" irrespective of "Benjamin's views on that 
subject when [the court had] not appointed him as conflict Counsel" (Tr., p.256). 
The SAPD agreed, explaining, "We've reviewed the same case law and we're not 
in disagreement with anything Your Honor's stated, as far as the Court's duty, the 
Court's obligation, the Court's prerogative and power" and, although Benjamin "is the 
SAPD's institutional conflict Counsel," the SAPD recognized "the Court may want to 
select independent Counsel of the Court's own choosing." (Tr., p.258.) Nevertheless, 
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the SAPD requested the state's motion be denied until Benjamin could "finish his 
investigation, understanding that the Court has to be satisfied and that the Court is very 
unlikely to be satisfied with current Counsel's representations." (Tr., p.261.) The SAPD 
filed a response to the state's motion reiterating many of the prior arguments to the court. 
(R., pp.1296-1309.) While setting a hearing on the state's motion, the district court 
reiterated it would be "happy to hear from Mr. Benjamin," but advising although it "may 
well have been appropriate and prudent" for the SAPD "to have engaged another mind on 
this issue," the court "wanted to be clear" even though the SAPD called him 
"independent doesn't mean that he's been appointed by the Court, or that [the Court] 
would be persuaded, and and certainly not bound by, his views." (Tr., p.268.) The 
SAPD agreed with the court's comments. (Id.) 
The state filed a brief supporting its motion (R., pp.1310-16) and the SAPD filed 
a response, conceding, "neither the court nor the State should necessarily be satisfied 
with representations made by the SAPD as to the nature of any potential conflict," but, 
contrary to the prior position at the August 6, 2010 hearing, the SAPD contended, 
"representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as independent conflict counsel, should not 
suffer the same skepticism and would certainly allow the Court to rely on his 
representations" (R., p.1320), an argument reiterated in Hall's "three suggested paths of 
inquiry" (R., pp.1323-25). However, the SAPD conceded if the court did not rely upon 
Benjamin's representations it still had "the discretion to appoint independent counsel," 
but contended the costs would be incurred by the district court because the SAPD had 
allegedly met its obligation under LC. § 19-871 to obtain "independent counsel" and 
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appointment of another attorney would "amount to expert opinion regarding the nature 
andextentoftheconflict"underl.C. §§ 19-860(b)and 19-4904. (R.,p.1325.) 
On August 26, 2010, a hearing was held on the state's motion. (Tr., pp.277-378.) 
The SAPD noted Benjamin was at the hearing and that the purpose of his retention by the 
SAPD "was not to advise the State Appellate Public Defender as to whether there was a 
conflict," but "to evaluate it and to take that straight to Mr. Hall, and for Mr. Hall, then, 
to be able to come in front of the court and say, I've got a conflict." (Tr., p.283.) 
Although the SAPD conceded the district court "has an obligation to be satisfied, truly 
satisfied, that there's no conflict" (Tr., p.289), the SAPD gave a "qualified objection" to 
the state's motion (Tr., p.286), explaining the court should first hear from Benjamin, and 
if he said "I've reviewed all the materials, I've seen this, I've spoken with Mr. Hall, and 
there's simply no conflict," there would be no need for further inquiry; otherwise the 
SAPD "wouldn't have grounds to really object to an investigation by the Court" (Tr., 
pp.289-90). Moreover, the SAPD conceded, "we've been compromised. That's why we 
would ask the Court to rely on conflict Counsel." (Tr., p.293.) 
After hearing arguments, the district court granted the state's motion, but then 
inquired regarding the "proper scope of the inquiry." (Tr., pp.294-95.) Because the court 
did not have sufficient information regarding even the existence of a possible conflict, the 
court declined to hear from Benjamin, but ordered the SAPD to an amended notice 
providing "something more specific about the ... basis for saying there is ... a potential 
conflict or not" beyond "contact." (Tr., pp.310-11.) Resisting the court's order, the 
SAPD contended, "We are not able to provide additional information to this Court 
because we don't represent Mr. Hall on this issue anymore, Mr. Benjamin docs." (Tr., 
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p.317.) The court reiterated the information it was seeking was the basis for SAPD's 
filing the P arte Notice and the nature of the "contact" between the SAPD and Hall's 
attorneys in Hall IL (Tr., pp.328-332.) 
The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (R., pp.1336-
40), stating "there were numerous contacts between trial counsel and post-conviction 
counsel," which included, "emails back and forth, primarily between Mr. Ackley and Ms. 
Kristal; phone calls between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain; meetings on at 
least two occasions where all attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with staff of 
the SAPD in order to facilitate or arrange the exchange of information regarding testing 
and experts" (R., p.1338); the amended notice did not discuss the genesis of the SAPD's 
Ex Parte Notice or the nature of any contact with the trial attorneys in Hall IL Moreover, 
the amended notice stated, "any further disclosure as to the specific content of those 
communications should be directed at Mr. Benjamin." (Id). Benjamin filed a Limited 
Notice of Appearance for purposes of "the conflict of interest only" (R., p.1341 ), 
and an affidavit under seal ("Benjamin Affidavit") (R., pp.1343-44, 2043). The state 
responded to the amended notice (R., p.2043), and the SAPD filed a "letter" raising 
various options the court could utilize to resolve the "conflict inquiry" (R., pp.1349-53). 
After another hearing (Tr., pp.348-78), on December 27, 2010, the district court 
entered Memorandum Decision and Order (R., pp.1368-78). Based in part upon the 
vague and conclusory nature of the SAPD and Benjamin's pleadings, particularly 
regarding the "factual basis for the filing of the Ex Parte Notice," the court concluded it 
was "presently lacking the factual background necessary to reach any conclusion" 
regarding the existence of a conflict stemming from the SAPD representing Hall during 
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Hall I post-conviction proceedings, having simultaneous "contact" with Hall's trial 
attorneys during Hall II guilt and sentencing phases, and then contending his trial 
attorneys were ineffective during the guilt and sentencing phases in Hall II. (R., pp.1373-
75.) Because it was "lacking enough facts" the court appointed R. Keith Roark as 
independent conflict counsel to "conduct an inquiry into whether a conflict exists," which 
could include "a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial, trial and pre-
sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to its appointment to represent the 
Petitioner in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case." (R., pp.1375-76.) The court 
rejected the SAPD's request that Roark's appointment "be at county expense since our 
office has already paid for the exact same service being provided" because, the court 
explained, "the SAPD has not provided the 'exact same service."' (R., pp.1376-77.) 
On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed a motion to reconsider (R., pp.1379-1414), 
permission to appeal (R., pp.1461-1480), and to take judicial notice of various documents 
from an unrelated capital post-conviction case, Abdullah v. State, #SPOT 0500308 (R., 
pp.1485-90). The district court denied all three motions. (R., pp.1965-88, 2010-14.) The 
SAPD also filed a motion to appeal the district court's order denying reconsideration (R., 
pp.1989-2000), which was likewise denied by the district court (R., pp.2006-09). 
The SAPD filed a motion to appeal the district court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was granted. (R., pp.2023-24.) The 
SAPD's motion to appeal the district court's order denying reconsideration and to 
consolidate was also granted by the supreme court. (R., pp.2-3.) Timely notices of 
appeal were filed by the SAPD. (R., pp.2015-22, 2025-33.) 
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ISSUES 
Hall has phrased the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether The District Court Was Justified In Ordering A Second 
Conflict Inquiry Where A Conflict Evaluation Had Already Been 
Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who Found No Conflict, 
The Petitioner Did Not Raise A Conflict, And Neither The State 
Nor The Court Can Identify Any Specific Facts That Would Either 
Undermine Those Determinations Or Give Rise To A Conflict? 
2. Whether The District Court Violated The Separation Of Powers By 
Ordering The SAPD To Pay For Services Already Provided Under 
The Statute Designating The Authority To Provide Conflict 
Counsel Specifically To The SAPD Where There Is No Evidence 
The SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their 
Obligation? 
3. Whether The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of 
Confidential And Attorney Client Privileged Information In 
Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict Inquiry? 
(Brief, p.5) (capitalization and punctuation in original). 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Because the SAPD refused to provide further information that would permit the 
district court to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry into whether the SAPD 
had a conflict of interest based upon contact with trial counsel, has Hall failed to 
establish the court erred by appointing independent conflict counsel to assist the 
court in its thorough and searching inquiry regarding the existence of a possible 
conflict? 
2. Because Hall's separation of powers argument was not raised before the district 
court, has it been waived? 
Alternatively, 
Because LC. § 19-871 deals with the payment of counsel and not the appointment 
of counsel, has Hall failed to establish the district court erred by appointing Roark 
to assist the court in conducting a thorough and searching inquiry into the 
existence of a conflict of interest? 
3. Has Hall failed to establish the district court's order appointing Roark and 
requiring that he assist the court in its thorough and searching inquiry improperly 
violates rules of confidentiality? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Err By Conducting An Inquiry Into The Existence Of A 
Possible Conflict Of Interest That Included The Appointment Of Independent Conflict 
Counsel To Investigate The Existence Of A Possible Conflict Of Interest 
A. Introduction 
Hall contends because neither he, the SAPD, nor Benjamin have determined an 
actual conflict of interest exists, "the district court has no basis to order a second conflict 
inquiry by Mr. Roark." (Brief, p.6.) However, the question before this Court is not 
whether an "actual conflict" exists, but the nature of the inquiry the district court must 
undertake to determine whether an actual conflict exists. Because the district court was 
not satisfied with the information provided by the SAPD and Benjamin, the court did not 
err by appointing independent conflict counsel to investigate the nature of the "possible 
conflict of interest" first raised by the SAPD in the Ex Parte Notice that stems from the 
SAPD's interaction with Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II while the SAPD was representing 
Hall during post-conviction proceedings in Hall I, particularly since Hall has now raised 
several ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in Hall II post-conviction 
proceedings that may be based upon interaction with the SAPD. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The adequacy of the inquiry into a conflict of interest is a constitutional issue 
over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 
P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414 
(2009). 
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C. Hall Has A Statutory Right To Conflict-Free Counsel 
While the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to include the right to be 
represented by conflict-free counsel, State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414 
(2009) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)), "[t]here is no Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Fields 
v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230 (2000) (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 
(1989)).2 While Hall does not have a Sixth Amendment right to post-conviction counsel, 
he does have a statutory right to counsel. Under I.C.R. 44.2(1), "Immediately following 
the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge who sentenced the defendant shall 
appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any 
post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719( 4) that the defendant may choose to 
seek." (Emphasis added). As explained in Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 
P.2d 86 (1995), when an Idaho statute provides an indigent defendant with a right to 
counsel, the courts look to cases that have "discussed the manner of proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel, even though the basis for the right in those cases was 
constitutional, not statutory." See also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34, 203 P.3d 
1221 (2009) (the statutory right to counsel enacted by the legislature for violent sexual 
predators establishes a right to effective assistance of counsel and "the appropriate 
2 Martinez v. Ryan, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), has not changed this basic Sixth 
Amendment principle because Martinez merely provided an "equitable ruling" that 
permits a federal habeas petitioner to raise ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel as "cause" to overcome procedurally defaulted claims. Martinez expressly noted 
it was "not the case" to resolve the question of whether there is a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims. 132 S.Ct. at 1315. 
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analysis is by reference to the well-established standards governing such claims under the 
Sixth Amendment"). 
While the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel has not been expressly 
extended to post-conviction proceedings, in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 233-34, 17 
P.3d 230 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court noted conflict of interest principles from 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and concluded, "Because these facts do not 
identify a conflict other than the one related to the trial, they also fail to support the claim 
of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction counsel as a result of a conflict of 
interest." Moreover, as explained above, when reviewing a statutory right to counsel, 
Idaho courts look to Sixth Amendment principles, which presumably include the right to 
conflict-free counsel. See Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 88; Smith, 146 Idaho at 833-34. 
D. The District Court Has A Duty To Inquire Into The "Possible Conflict Of 
Interest" Raised In Hall's Ex Parte Notice 
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular 
conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 
60, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing Wood v. Georgi'!, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 
(1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). Even when the record 
demonstrates the mere ''possibility of a conflict of interest" the court has a duty to inquire 
further. Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has 
explained the duty to inquire "is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a 
vague, unspecified possibility of conflict, such as that which 'inheres in almost every 
instance of multiple representation."' Mickens v. Taylor, 53 5 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002) 
(quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348). 
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As explained in Severson, 147 Idaho at 423 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 
U.S. 475, 488 (1978)), "A trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry, under certain 
circumstances will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's conviction." If the 
defendant does not object and the court fails to make proper inquiry, "the defendant's 
conviction will only be reversed if he or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lav.'Yer's performance." Id. (citing Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 348). 
However, "once a defendant raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is 
constitutionally obligated to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists. A 
court's failure to make a proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will result in 
the automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction." Id. 
While this duty to inquire has not been expressly extended to post-conviction 
proceedings, because Idaho courts look to Sixth Amendment principles when reviewing a 
statutory right to counsel, those principles presumably include the duty to inquire. See 
~~~~, 127 Idaho at 88; Smith, 146 Idaho at 833-34. Moreover, several jurisdictions 
have opined the duty to inquire applies in post-conviction cases irrespective of whether 
there is a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 
674, 683 (Tenn. 2010), the court expressly expanded the duty to inquire to post-
conviction proceedings. In People v. Hardin, 818 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd 
2004), the court adopted a duty to inquire when "a defendant presents facts suggesting a 
conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public defender having to attack another." 
Finally, in 778 N.E.2d 129, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), the court held, 
"the trial court had a duty in this case to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest when 
Pelphrey filed his Crim. R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas or in the alternative 
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for post-conviction relief, because at that time the court knew or should have known that 
a possible conflict of interest existed." 
\Vhile Hall initially appears to concede the district court had a duty to inquire, he 
appears to backtrack by contending the court did not have a duty to inquire "[b ]ecause the 
possibility of a conflict was raised by Mr. Hall's counsel alone, and not by Mr. Hall." 
703, "In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has 
an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict may exist." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has explained the duty to inquire exists when the trial court is merely 
aware of the "possibility of a conflict of interest." Wood, 450 U.S. at 272. The question 
is not whether the defendant or counsel know of a conflict and advised the court, but 
whether the court "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist." 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 60. Indeed, it is entirely possible the court may know or 
reasonably should know of a possible conflict that could be unknown to the defendant or 
his attorney. It is even possible counsel would advise a defendant not to raise a possible 
conflict because counsel made the independent determination that an actual conflict does 
not exist. Nevertheless, while there may not be an automatic reversal if a defendant does 
not make an objection, there is still a duty to inquire, and if it is determined that an actual 
conflict exists, new counsel must be appointed. 
Moreover, while Hall did not raise an "objection" based upon an alleged conflict, 
it was the SAPD that initially brought the issue before the district court. There was 
simply no basis for the court to ignore the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice even though it did not 
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constitute an "objection" based upon an actual conflict, but merely advised the court of 
the possibility of a conflict. The danger associated with a possible conflict in capital 
post-conviction proceedings that stems from post-conviction counsel's involvement in 
the underlying trial is obvious. In English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998), 
the court reexamined an Oklahoma statute requiring defendants to raise all ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal or the claim would be forfeited. The court 
recognized defendants "must be allowed to obtain an objective assessment of trial 
counsel's performance and must be allowed to adequately develop the factual basis for 
any claim of ineffectiveness," id. at 1261 (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
(ineffective assistance of counsel claims not raised on direct appeal were not waived if 
the defendant continued to be represented by trial counsel or if the ineffectiveness claims 
required investigation outside the trial record); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303-
04 (2nd Cir. 1995) (same). This principle was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Hoffman 
v. Arave, 236 F.3d 1-3 5 (9th Cir. 2000), where the court concluded, because the 
same attorneys represented the defendant at trial and post-conviction, the defendant was 
unable to obtain an objective assessment of trial counsel's performance and develop the 
factual basis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Likev.rise, in Carter v. State, 362 
S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987) (citing Commomyealth v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974)), the 
court concluded: 
When an applicant is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial 
counsel, there is no waiver of the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Absent a showing that the applicant was specifically advised of the 
hazards of being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction 
hearing and that the applicant consented to such an arrangement, a 
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successive post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, should not be barred. 
It was for these reasons that I.C.R. 44.2 was implemented, requiring that capital 
post-conviction counsel be someone other than trial counsel, which "satisfie[s] the 
requirement that [capital post-conviction petitioners] be afforded the ability to consult 
with different counsel on appeal in order to obtain an objective assessment of trial 
counsel's performance." Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 423 n.2, 80 PJd 1021 (2003). 
Finally, as is oft repeated by the capital defense bar: 
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life 
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year 
or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding 
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case. 
Lankford v. State, 500 .S. 110, 125 n.21 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 305 (1976) (footnote omitted)). 
Based upon the SAPD's Parte Notice and the pleadings subsequently filed by 
the respective parties, coupled with heightened standards of review in capital cases, the 
district court had a duty to inquire regarding the possibility of a potential conflict of 
interest stemming from the SAPD's contact with Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II. 
E. The District Court Was Permitted To Establish The Parameters Ofits Inquiry Into 
The "Possible Conflict Ofinterest" Raised In the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice 
"In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the 
potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the 
record. The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's 
dissatisfaction, distrust or concern." Severson, 215 P.3d at 424 (emphasis added) 
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(internal quotations and citations omitted). The inquiry must also be '"targeted at the 
conflict issue."' State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Selsor v. Kaiser, 81F.3d1492, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996)). While trial courts are 
"entitled to rely on representations made by counsel," they "may inquire further into the 
facts." Id. (citing Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967)). 
Because the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice was, as conceded by counsel, "not very 
specific," "opaque,'' and "didn't include any facts" (Tr., pp.241-42), the trial court was 
not able to "target" the exact concern being raised by the SAPD. Undoubtedly, the 
district court's concern was piqued by the concession that the "SAPD cooperated with 
trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert information obtained in Hall I" (Ex 
Parte Notice, p.2), particularly in light of the claims in the amended post-conviction 
petition that challenged trial counsels' effectiveness regarding testing and expert 
witnesses (R., pp.177-83, 221-26, 241-45). Moreover, the SAPD's assertion that "Ms. 
Romero became aware that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Swenson may have had contact with 
trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued 
representation of Mr. Hall" (Ex Parte Notice, pp.2-3) would have caused the district court 
significant consternation, resulting in the conclusion that there was even more "contact" 
between the SAPD and trial counsel than sharing of "testing and expert infonnation." 
This is particularly important because the amended petition raised an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim that was based upon a "complete breakdown in the attorney-
client relationship" (R., pp.121-22), which could have been exacerbated by contact with 
the SAPD. Indeed, the SAPD was concerned enough that Benjamin was retained to 
"independently evaluate the conflict" and "advise Mr. Hall whether or not a conflict 
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should be waived." (Id., p.3.) Moreover, the SAPD conceded the filing of the Ex Parte 
Notice "has to cause the Court some concern." (Tr., p.284.) 
The district court's concern obviously was not alleviated by the SAPD's 
Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (R., pp.1336-40), but actually increased 
the necessity of conducting a "thorough and searching inquiry." For example, discussing 
the "contact" that "may present a conflict of interest,'' the SAPD merely explained there 
were "numerous contacts between trial counsel and post-conviction counsel" that 
occurred "[ o ]ver the course of several months,'' which included: (1) e-mails, "primarily" 
between Ackley and Kristal; (2) phone calls between Ackley and Kristal or Chastain; (3) 
at least two meetings "where all attorneys were present"; and ( 4) additional contacts with 
SAPD staff to facilitate the exchange of information regarding testing and experts. (R., 
p.1338.) Because the SAPD explained the Ex Parte Motion "was filed due to the extent 
of the communications between counsel" (id.) (emphasis added), this was not de minimus 
contact, and the district court had every right to be concerned and want further inquiry. 
Likewise, Benjamin's affidavit would not have alleviated the district court's 
concerns because it also failed to discuss the nature of the communication between the 
SAPD and trial counsel, merely explaining, "The conflict issue centers around the 
communication between former SAPD lawyers, i.e., Paula Swenson and Mark Ackley, 
and Mr. Hall's trial lawyers, i.e., Robert Chastain and Deborah Kristal, before and during 
the second trial." (Benjamin Affidavit, p.2.) Rather than explain the genesis of the 
SAPD's concern regarding the "extent of the communications between counsel" that 
generated the Ex Parte Notice, Benjamin merely explained when the "communication 
could result in a conflict of interest" (R., p.2) and that "there is no conflict of interest" 
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(Id., p.4). Nevertheless, despite his conclusion regarding the existence of a conflict, 
Benj arnin noted there was one exception where it "appears one of the former SAPD 
la'A-yers gave advice to the trial law}'ers to take a certain action." (Id., p.5.) While 
Benjamin concluded there was still no conflict even though the "trial la~ers took that 
advice and the result was favorable to Mr. Hall" (id.), there is no indication regarding the 
nature or subject matter of the advice that would permit the trial court to make its own 
determination regarding the existence of a conflict of interest. 
Hall's primary complaint stems from the district court's decision to appoint Roark 
to conduct an investigation regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest raised in 
Hall's Ex Parte Notice. (Brief, pp.11-16.) While the state certainly appreciates the 
SAPD's desire to conserve resources by forcing the district court to merely rely upon the 
investigation and representations of Benjamin, the court's duty to conduct a "thorough 
and searching" inquiry cannot be abrogated and given to an attorney retained by the very 
entity that may have precipitated the alleged conflict; it is the court's inquiry, not 
counsels' or someone chosen by counsel. As explained in Harjo v. Reynolds, 894 
F.Supp. 1496, 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1995): 
The Holloway court denied the suggestion it was transferring to 
defense counsel the authority of the trial judge to rule on the existence or 
risk of a conflict and to appoint separate counsel. It said "our holding 
does not preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis for 
defense counsel's representations regarding a conflict of interests without 
improperly requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the 
client." Id. at 487, 98 S.Ct. at 1180. The Court also noted the trial court 
could discipline counsel who presented such motions for dilatory 
purposes. 
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See also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 ("Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should 
know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry") (emphasis 
added). 
The state recognizes "[a]n attorney ... is in the best position professionally and 
ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the 
course of a trial," Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485 (internal quotations and citation omitted), 
that defense attorneys "are officers of the court, and when they address the judge 
solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under 
oath," id. at 486, and that "trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good 
faith and good judgment of defense counsel," Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347. See also-=== 
States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted) ("In ascertaining whether the risk of conflict warrants appointment of 
separate counsel, the court is entitled to rely on the good faith and good judgment of 
defense counsel who represents to the court that no conflict exists"). However, while 
courts may rely upon the representations of counsel, "[a] court may inquire further into 
the facts." 14 7 Idaho at 704. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explained, "it is 
good practice for a trial judge to make inquiry when the possibility of a conflict of 
interest seems apparent." Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 1979). 
As explained in Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Ci:r. 1994), "the trial 
judge here should have conducted his own neutral inquiry as soon as he heard [counsel's] 
disclosure, in order to reach his own informed judgment." When presented with a 
possible conflict of interest claim, "at a minimum the trial court should have requested 
that [counsel] give him some idea of what the conflict entailed to allow him to determine 
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whether to order [counsel] to withdraw." United States v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1057, 
Cir. 1992), the mere reading of a file and colloquy with defense counsel may not be 
sufficient inquiry. Moreover, the need to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry "does 
not preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's 
representations regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of 
the confidential communications of the client." Holloway:, 435 U.S. at 487. 
The difficulties of this inquiry and the determination that an attorney must be 
disqualified due to a conflict of interest are discussed in United States v. Evanson, 584 
F.2d 904, 911 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth Circuit recognized "the need for appellate 
courts to be highly deferential to the trial judge's judgment" because 
[d]isqualification motions ... are not assessed "with the wisdom of 
hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial context 
when relationships between the parties are seen through a glass, darkly." 
To assess "[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of 
interest," the courts must predict how events will unfold at trial, a daunting 
task that can require an exercise of "instinct and judgment based on 
experience." 
Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988)). Therefore, the "facts 
and circumstances of each case ... must be left to the informed judgment of the trial 
court" because 
(c]ourts confronting potential conflicts of interest face the prospect of 
being whip-sawed by assertions of error no matter which way they rule. If 
a court disqualifies counsel, the defendant can raise ... a claim that he 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to chosen counsel. But if the court 
declines to disqualify counsel, the defendant may claim that his counsel's 
conflict of interest resulted in constitutionally ineffective performance at 
trial. 
(internal quotes and citations omitted). 
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Hall's final complaint stems from his contention that "any possible conflict 
created by actions taken by Ms. Swenson or Mr. Ackley could not be imputed to Mr. 
Hall's current post-conviction counsel at the SAPD." (Brief, pp.14-15.) However, Hall 
is arguing the proverbial "cart before the horse"; the issue is not whether a conflict exists 
or the nature of the alleged conflict, but the nature of the inquiry that must be conducted 
to determine the existence of a conflict. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict 
actually exists. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a 
conflict, it must obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver from the 
defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. If 
on the other hand, the court concludes that a conflict of interest does not 
exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 (internal citations omitted). 
Moreover, if the underlying basis for the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice was nothing 
more than contact between Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II and former employees of the 
SAPD while representing Hall in Hall I post-conviction proceedings and it is Hall's 
position that such contact did not amount to a potential conflict of interest, why did the 
SAPD file the Ex Parte Notice and retain Benjamin to determine whether an actual 
conflict exists? Clearly, neither the SAPD nor Benjamin has adequately explained the 
underlying basis of the contact that resulted in the filing of the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice. 
Rather, as explained by the court, "Instead of being forthcoming and candid with the 
Court about the facts in this case, the SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague 
possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and 
defer all questions to Mr. Benjamin even though he represents the Petitioner and not the 
SAPD." (R., pp.1373-74.) As the court recognized, "its duty to conduct a thorough and 
searching inquiry would [not] be satisfied in this case by simply accepting the opinions of 
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counsel regarding whether a conflict exists without any disclosure of the factual basis for 
that opinion" because the court "is presently lacking the factual background necessary to 
reach any conclusion." (R., p.1374.) 
Because the district court has an independent duty to conduct its own thorough 
and searching inquiry regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest first raised in the 
SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, Hall has failed to establish the court erred by appointing Roark 
to assist the court in conducting that inquiry. 
II. 
Because It Was Not Raised Before The District Court, Hall Has Waived His 
Separation Of Powers Claim 
A. Introduction 
Hall contends the district court's order requiring the SAPD to pay for Roark's 
services violates the separation of powers doctrine of art. II, § 1, of the Idaho 
Constitution. (Brief, pp.16-25.) 
While Hall challenged the district court's authority to require the SAPD to pay for 
Roark's services, the argument was never couched in the context of a separation of 
powers violation. Indeed, with the exception of art. VII, § 13 (R., pp.1408-09), Idaho's 
Constitution was never cited to the district court, let alone art. II, § 1 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Because Hall never raised this argument in the court below, providing the 
district court with an opportunity to rule upon this issue, it has been waived on appeal. 
Even if the issue was properly raised, because LC. § 19-871 merely requires the SAPD to 
pay for the services of conflict counsel and does not prohibit the district court from 
making an appropriate appointment, Hall's claim fails. 
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B. Hall's Separation Of Powers Claim Was Waived Because It Was Not Raised 
Before The District Court 
It is well settled that constitutional issues will not be considered when raised for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 565, 50 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); State v. 
Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997)). Furthermore, 
failure to raise an issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court the 
opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. State 
v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 
181, 824 P.2d 109 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 
1997). The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly applied this fundamental appellate 
doctrine to claims based upon the separation of powers doctrine. Fodge, 121 Idaho at 
195. Likewise it has been applied to other constitutional challenges. Ransom, 13 7 Idaho 
at 565; State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho 667, 672, 818 P.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, ---, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Hall 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information 
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 980. 
Hall's separation of powers claim fails because, not only has he failed to argue 
fundamental error, the first prong of Perry cannot be met since his claim is not alleged to 
have violated federal constitutional rights, but is a challenge under Idaho's constitution. 
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C. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law this Court reviews de novo." State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 
P.3d 970 (2011). 
D. Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To 
Pay For Roark's Services Violates The Separation Of Powers Clause 
Hall's argument is premised upon art. II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution and the 
contention that LC. § 19-871 prohibits the district court from appointing conflict counsel 
and making the SAPD pay for the services of conflict counsel. (Brief, pp.16-24.) Hall 
has simply misunderstood LC. § 19-871. 
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution reads as follows: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person 
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly 
directed or permitted. 
In 1998, the legislature enacted the State Appellate Public Defender Act to reduce 
the financial burden to the counties associated with the costs of legal representation of 
indigent defendants, particularly convictions for first-degree murder, by "provid[ing] 
competent counsel but avoid paying high hourly rates to independent counsel to represent 
indigent defendants in appellate proceedings." 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.389, pp.1190-
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95; LC. § 19-868. Duties of the SAPD include representation of certain felony appeals 
and post-conviction relief proceedings in district court in capital cases. LC. § 19-870(1 ). 
Idaho Code § 19-870(3) permits the SAPD to "employ deputy state appellate public 
defenders and other employees necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the office" 
and "contract with private attorneys to provide representation on a case-by-case basis 
when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources." Additionally, LC. § 19-871 
addresses those situations where the SAPD is "unable to carry out the duties required in 
this act." In its entirety, it reads as follows: 
Should the state appellate public defenders be unable to carry out 
the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other 
reason, the state appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for 
indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state 
appellate public defender. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
While LC. 19-870(3) permits the SAPD to "contract with private attorneys ... 
when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources," LC.§ 19-871 does not require 
nor even permit the SAPD to "arrange" for the appointment of conflict counsel when 
there is "a conflict of counsel or any other reason," but only for the compensation of 
conflict counsel. In non-capital post-conviction cases, LC. § 19-4904 permits the district 
court to appoint counsel "[i]f the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of 
representation, including ... a court appointed attorney. While LC. § 19-4904 requires 
the costs be borne by the respective county, based upon LC. § 19-871, the SAPD must 
"arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the 
state appellate public defender." However, because the State Appellate Public Defender 
Act merely permits the SAPD to "contract with private attorneys ... when such contracts 
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would conserve budgetary resources," but only allows the SAPD to "arrange for counsel 
for indigent defendants to be compensated" when the SAPD is "unable to carry out the 
duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason," the 
district court must be permitted, pursuant to LC. § 19-4904, to appoint conflict counsel in 
capital post-conviction cases whom the SAPD must arrange to be "compensated out of 
the budget of the state appellate public defender" under I. C. § 19-8 71. 
This interpretation of the State Appellate Public Defender Act is based upon a 
plain reading of the Act and the plain meaning of the words in the Act, which constitutes 
the basis for determining the legislature's intent when it was enacted. As explained in 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867, 264 P.3d 970 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State 
Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289 (2009)): 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with 
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. 
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the 
Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that 
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language 
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must 
be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction." 
Moreover, it is consistent with I.C.R. 44.2(1 ), which reads as follows: 
Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty, the 
district judge who sentences the defendant shall appoint at least one 
attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any post-
conviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719(4) that the defendant may 
choose to seek. This appointment shall be made in compliance with the 
standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, and the attorney appointed 
shall be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant prior 
to the imposition of the death penalty. This new counsel shall not be 
considered to be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the 
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defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for the 
defendant. 
While LC. § 19-870 requires the appointment of the SAPD in capital post-
conviction proceedings in those counties participating in the capital crimes defense act 
and where the petitioner was sentenced on or after September 1, 1998, there is no 
limitation on the district court's ability to appoint conflict counsel in capital post-
conviction proceedings. Moreover, because I.C.R. 44.2(1) still requires that capital post-
conviction counsel meet the standards of I.C.R. 44.3, the district court has final authority 
over the appointment of post-conviction counsel even if it does not involve conflict 
counsel, while the SAPD has authority and is mandated under l.C. § 19-871 to "arrange 
for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state 
appellate defender." (Emphasis added.) In other words, if the district court concluded 
the SAPD did not meet the requirements of !.C.R. 44.3, the court has authority to appoint 
counsel that is qualified and order that attorney be compensated out of the SAPD' s 
budget. The same would be true anytime the district court concluded the SAPD was 
"unable to carry out the duties required in [the] act because of a conflict of interest or any 
other reason," I.C. § 19-871 (emphasis added), including a "thorough and searching" 
inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists based upon prior contact between the 
SAPD and trial counsel that was actually raised by the SAPD in its Parte Notice. 
Moreover, as explained in the preceding section, because it is the district court's duty to 
conduct the inquiry and determine the procedure to be utilized to conduct the inquiry, it is 
simply irrelevant that the SAPD had already contracted with Benjamin, particularly when 
the district court concluded his inquiry was insufficient. 
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Because the district court has authority over the appointment of capital post-
conviction counsel, Hall has failed to establish the district court's order appointing Roark 
violates the separation of powers doctrine. 
III. 
The District Court Did Not Err By Requiring The Possible Disclosure Of Attorney-Client 
Communications To Either Roark Or The District Court 
A. Introduction 
Relying upon I.R.E. 502 and I.R.P.C. 1.6, Hall contends the district court erred by 
requiring the SAPD to allegedly disclose material that is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege to Roark. (Brief, pp.25-35.) While Hall spends considerable space 
differentiating between the two rules, the state acknowledges, while similar, they are 
different concepts, and I.R.P.C. 1.6 is a broader rule relating to the information a client 
provides during the attorney's representation of the client. See l.R.P. C. 1.6, commentary 
3. Nevertheless, because the district court has the duty to conduct a "thorough and 
searching" inquiry to ascertain the existence of an actual conflict, particularly when the 
possibility of that conflict was raised by Hall, there is no violation of the rules of 
confidentiality when that information is provided to Roark or the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The district court's conclusion whether 'statements are protected by an 
individual attorney-client privilege is a mixed question of law and fact which this court 
reviews independently and without deference to the district court."' United States v. 
Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 
1158 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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C. The Court Is Permitted To Inquire Into Confidential Information When 
Conducting Its Inquiry 
Rule 1.6(a) of the LR.P.C. states, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating 
to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted 
by paragraph (b ). " Rule 1.6(b) explains, "A lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... 
(6) to comply with other law or a court order." Apparently, Hall's argument is based 
upon the contention that the district court's order is too broad because, according to Hall, 
"[i]t is entirely unnecessary to waive Mr. Hall's privilege and confidentiality with the 
SAPD or Mr. Benjamin, and order the complete disclosure of files, in order to discover 
the nature of conversations between the SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, where the 
district court has already waived the attorney-client privilege regarding Mr. Chastain and 
Mr. [sic] Kristal." (Brief, p.32.) 
However, as detailed above, the inquiry that must be conducted by the district 
court cannot be transferred to the SAPD, Benjamin, or even Roark, but is an inquiry that 
must conducted by the district court in a fashion that permits the court to conduct a 
"thorough and searching" inquiry such that the court can detennine whether a conflict of 
interests exists with the SAPD. Moreover, Hall's reliance upon Holloway, the only case 
he cites to support his position, is misplaced. Addressing the state's concern that reliance 
upon counsel's representation that there was no conflict was tantamount to transferring 
the decision to counsel and counsel might abuse that authority for purposes of delay or 
obstruction of the trial, the Supreme Court explained its holding "did not impair the trial 
court's ability to deal with counsel who resort to such tactics. Nor does our holding 
29 
preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's 
representations regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of 
the confidential communications of the client." Id. The Court continued, "This case does 
not require an inquiry into the extent of a court's power to compel an attorney to disclose 
confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client." Id. at 
487 n.11. In dicta, the Court further noted, "Such compelled disclosure creates 
significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure is to a judge who may 
be called upon later to impose sentences on the attorney's clients." Id. 
However, because the extent of Rule 1.6 is a matter of state law, this Court is not 
bound to follow the dicta in Holloway. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266 n.2 (Fla. 
2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Additionally, this is not a case where the SAPD stated there is 
an actual conflict of interest and the state or the district court were concerned about the 
validity of the allegation. Rather, the inquiry into whether a possible conflict exists was 
initiated by the SAPD when the Ex Parte Notice was filed seeking a determination of 
whether an actual conflict exists. Based upon the exceptionally vague nature of the Ex 
Parte Notice and the SAPD's and Benjamin's refusal to provide necessary information, 
the district court was mandated to explore options that might not normally exist, 
including Roark's appointment. As explained in Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 
(Alaska 1996), conducting in camera proceedings or appointing independent conflict 
counsel that could intrude upon an attorney's relationship with a client is appropriate 
"upon a substantial showing of necessity." As detailed above, based upon the actions of 
the SAPD and Benjamin, that showing has been met in Hall's case. 
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Moreover, Hall has failed to cite any case reversing a trial court's decision that 
the "thorough and searching" inquiry requires the disclosure of attorney-client 
communication. Indeed, it appears such inquiries would mandate at least some disclosure 
of attorney-client communications, provided they are conducted in camera or are 
otherwise not disclosed to the state. In United States v. Burnett, 2009 WL 3747204, * 1 
(E.D. Tenn. 2009), the defendant complained he had a "complete loss of trust" in his 
attorney and demanded new counsel be appointed. Because the defendant had the burden 
of establishing "good cause such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in 
communication or an irreconcilable conflict" before substitute counsel could be 
appointed, the district court "conducted a sealed, ex parte hearing to inquire into the 
reasons for the Defendant's dissatisfaction" with his attorney that resulted in the court 
hearing "confidential statements from [the attorney] and the Defendant in order to 
determine whether good cause for the appointment of new counsel" existed. Id.; see also 
United States v. Monday, 2009 WL 2745998, *1 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). In Hamilton v. 
Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1012-13 (11th Cir. 1992), the court concluded "the reading of a file 
for an unrelated purpose is inadequate exploration of the possibility of conflict" and "by 
asking defense counsel to disclose trial strategy in open court, the trial court improperly 
placed counsel in a situation where in order to adequately respond he would have had to 
disclose client confidence, thereby breaching attorney/client confidentiality." However, 
at no time has the district court asked any of Hall's attorneys to "disclose trial strategy in 
open court." Rather, the information that is to be gathered by Roark is itself confidential 
and will be provided only to the district court, not the state. 
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Finally, Hall's concern that once the attorney-client privilege or rule of 
confidentiality is waived, it is waived forever and the protection cannot be restored is 
overstated. (Brief, p.34.) There is no indication that if confidential information is 
obtained it will ever be provided to the state. Rather, as explained above, the information 
can be provided to the district court in camera. Moreover, the alleged dangers associated 
with providing the district court confidential information is grossly overstated. Judges 
are regularly bombarded by information that cannot be considered in future decisions, 
including pretrial hearings, post-conviction proceedings after having sat during the 
underlying trial and sentencing, retrials, resentencings. Nevertheless, judges are expected 
to disregard the prior information and make judicial rulings based upon admissible 
evidence. In State v. Beam. 115 Idaho 208, 215, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the court 
explained the parameters of motions to disqualify judges based upon bias and information 
gleaned from prior or other proceedings: 
Every trial judge who rules upon a post conviction review 
proceeding or an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence will previously have 
prejudged the matter, often forming extremely strong opinions as to the 
sentence which should be imposed, and will no doubt be convinced that 
the procedure followed and the sentence imposed was correct, particularly 
where the trial court proceedings have been affirmed on appeal by this 
Court. It would be an unusual case in which a trial judge, when called 
upon to rule on an LC.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence, would not 
approach the case on the basis that the sentence imposed was correct, and 
require the defendant to shoulder "the burden of showing that the original 
sentence was unduly severe." State v. Martinez, 113 Idaho 535, 536, 746 
P.2d 994, 995 (1987). Coming to the case with that frame of mind does 
not constitute bias or prejudice within the meaning of I.C.R. 25(b )( 4) and 
does not require disqualification of the trial judge. In this case the judge 
in question had presided at the trial of both Beam and Scroggins. He had 
heard all of the evidence regarding this brutal murder and raping of an 
innocent thirteen year old girl. He had presided at the sentencing 
proceedings in which extensive mitigation and aggravation evidence was 
presented to the court. Based upon all of that evidence, the trial court then 
arrived at the judgment that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
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mitigating circumstances and sentenced both defendants to death. The 
death penalty is reserved for only the most heinous of first degree 
murders. The very nature of the sentencing process in capital cases 
requires a trial judge to form strong opinions and convictions that the 
defendant merits the most severe penalty. It would be extremely unlikely 
and no doubt improper for a trial court to impose a death penalty unless it 
had formed the strong opinion and belief that the defendant had no 
redeeming features, and that the circumstances of this particular case 
justified the imposition of this most serious penalty known to the law. 
Accordingly, when a trial judge is called upon to rule upon a petition for 
post conviction relief, or a motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 
35, particularly in a case where the death penalty has been imposed, he 
comes to the case after having already formed strong opinions and beliefs 
regarding the atrocious nature of the crime, the unredeemable character of 
the defendant, and the need of society to impose this most serious of 
criminal penalties. A trial judge is not required to erase from his mind all 
that has gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any human being 
could. Rather, when faced with an I.C.R. 25(b)(4) motion to disqualify for 
bias and prejudice in a post conviction or I.C.R. 35 proceeding, the trial 
judge need only conclude that he can properly perform the legal 
analysis which the law requires of him, recognizing that he has already 
pre-judged the case and has formed strong and lasting opinions regarding 
the worth of the defendant and the sentence that ought to be imposed to 
punish the defendant and protect society. 
(Emphasis added); see also State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297, 298-99, 193 P.3d 457 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
The Ninth Circuit has explained: 
But even if a case has been reversed on appeal, it has long been regarded 
as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand 
and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant. While some 
may argue that a judge will feel the motivation to vindicate a prior 
conclusion when confronted with a question for the second or third time, 
for instance, upon trial after a remand, . .. we accept the notion that the 
conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his 
biases of this character, and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their 
effect. 
Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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The Ninth Circuit has further discussed the issue of judicial bias stemming from 
an Idaho capital case where the petitioner contended the trial judge's presiding over his 
co-defendant's case not only constituted actual bias, but the appearance of bias. Paradis 
v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejected this argument, explaining, 
"Paradis' entire argument is based upon the mistaken notion that a trial judge's exposure 
to evidence, standing alone, demonstrates bias." 
117 F.3d 1094, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted), " The fact that the trial judge in the original 
trial was also the trial judge in the second trial is insufficient to establish bias and 
prejudice. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same 
case upon its remand and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." See 
recuse himself when subsequently sentencing defendant on retrial in a capital case). 
There is simply no basis for concluding a judge cannot or will not apply these 
same principles to information that may otherwise be protected by attorney-client 
confidentiality. 
Further, even when protected information has been provided to the state, it may 
not be used in future proceedings. As explained in ~ittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 
718 (9th Cir. 2003), "a litigant waives the attorney client privilege by putting the lawyer's 
performance at issue during the course of litigation." When ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are raised in post-conviction, the courts have concluded there is an 
implied waiver associated with confidential communications between trial counsel and 
the petitioner. Id. at 719; Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1994); Sanborn v. 
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Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Ky. 1998). Nevertheless, the state is not 
permitted to utilize such information if a retrial or resentencing is required. Bittaker, 331 
F.3d at 727-28. The state is certainly not asking that any confidential communications be 
provided to the state, but submits the attorney-client privilege is not, as contended by 
Hall, "waived forever." 
Additionally, the implied waiver doctrine discussed in Bittaker and other cases is 
associated with the "fairness principle," which is "often expressed in terms of preventing 
a party from using the privilege as both a shield and a sword." Id. at 719. While the state 
is not requesting that any confidential information be provided to the state, Hall's Ex 
Parte Notice certainly has the appearance of "using the privilege as both a shield and a 
sword"; he has raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest between the SAPD and 
trial counsel - possibly interjecting error into future post-conviction proceedings - but is 
unwilling to provide the district court with the information necessary to conduct the 
thorough and searching inquiry mandated by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho 
Supreme Court. The state and the district court must have the ability to establish for the 
record and future appellate review whether the contact between the SAPD and Hall II 
trial counsel resulted in a conflict of interest when Hall has raised ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims that may involve the SAPD's interjection into the trial and sentencing 
phases of Hall II, particularly since I.C.R. 44.2 was expressly enacted to prevent the very 
conflict that was being investigated by the district court and provide Hall "an objective 
assessment of trial counsel's performance" by independent counsel. See English, 146 
F.3d at 1259; Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 231-35. Simply stated, if the attorneys from the 
SAPD's office had abided by the duties provided by the legislature in LC. § 19-870 and 
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not interjected themselves into Hall II trial and sentencing proceedings by apparently 
having unspecified contact with the Hall II trial attorneys, these issues would have been 
avoided. However, Hall wants to utilize the doctrines and rules associated with 
confidential attorney-client communications as a shield to prevent the district court from 
conducting the thorough and searching inquiry into the possible conflict raised by the 
SAPD in the Ex Parte Notice that cannot even be "targeted" because the SAPD will not 
provide the information the district court needs for the inquiry. This "shield and sword" 
mentality cannot be tolerated by this Court. 
On the basis of the rather unique facts associated with this case, Hall has failed to 
establish the district court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's interlocutory orders, (1) 
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict 
Counsel and (2) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; 
and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, be affirmed on appeal. 
DATED this zgth day of August, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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